towerops/bugs.md

Code Review Findings

Full codebase audit conducted 2026-05-12. Covers OWASP Top 10, performance, reliability, and correctness issues across the entire TowerOps Web application.

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HIGH

H7. Unauthenticated Webhook Endpoints

File: lib/towerops/router.ex:232-239

Severity: HIGH — Webhook endpoints protected only by per-org secret, no router-level auth

Description: Gaiia, PagerDuty, and MikroTik webhooks use the :api pipeline which only has plug :accepts, ["json"] — no authentication. Auth is delegated entirely to each controller.

Fix: Add webhook auth plug at pipeline level.

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H9. CSP img-src https: Wildcard

File: lib/towerops_web/plugs/security_headers.ex:38

Severity: HIGH — Broad data exfiltration vector via any XSS

Description: https: for img-src allows images from any HTTPS origin. Combined with any XSS, an attacker can exfiltrate data via image request URLs.

Fix: Restrict to specific domains.

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H11. Hardcoded Session Salts (8 bytes)

File: lib/towerops_web/endpoint.ex:11-12 File: config/config.exs:135

Severity: HIGH — Weak entropy for cookie signing; identical across all environments

Description: signing_salt: "hrDZxLhd" and encryption_salt: "vK3p8mNx" are hardcoded 8-byte salts. Phoenix recommends 16+ bytes. Also baked into source code — can't rotate without deploy.

Fix: Load from env vars, increase to 16+ bytes.

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H13. PromEx Metrics Server Unauthenticated

File: config/config.exs:106-117

Severity: HIGH — Internal metrics accessible without any auth

Description: auth_strategy: :none on metrics server. Exposes DB query performance, memory info, business logic execution times.

Fix: Add at minimum basic token auth, or document network isolation explicitly.

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H21. Unbounded Sequential Processing in Sync Workers

Files:

• gaiia_sync_worker.ex:20
• sonar_sync_worker.ex:16
• splynx_sync_worker.ex:16
• visp_sync_worker.ex:16
• netbox_sync_worker.ex:20

Severity: HIGH — Single job processes ALL integrations sequentially; 10+ minute blocks

Description: Enum.map(integrations, &sync_integration/1) — sequentially syncs every enabled integration in a single Oban job. Blocks the queue slot for extended periods.

Fix: Follow UispSyncWorker pattern — staggered per-integration jobs with unique constraints.

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H22. DataRetentionWorker Unbounded DELETEs

File: lib/towerops/workers/data_retention_worker.ex:61-173

Severity: HIGH — Massive DELETE statements with no batching

Description: Each table purged with a single DELETE. On millions of rows: WAL amplification, autovacuum storms, long row locks, blocked concurrent reads.

Fix: Use batched deletes (LIMIT 10000 in a loop) or partition-based truncation.

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H24. WeatherSyncWorker Never Starts

File: lib/towerops/workers/weather_sync_worker.ex

Severity: HIGH — Weather data never fetched (dead code path)

Description: Worker self-schedules at end of each run via schedule_next/0, but no initial trigger exists in any cron config. First run never occurs.

Fix: Add to Oban cron schedule or trigger at application startup.

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H25. No Device/Site Organization Validation on Check Creation

File: lib/towerops_web/controllers/api/v1/checks_controller.ex:47-60

Severity: HIGH — Check can reference devices from other organizations

Description: Only check_type is validated. The device_id is not verified to belong to the authenticated org.

Fix: Add device access verification using ScopedResource.fetch/3.

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MEDIUM

M1. Resource Scoping Reveals Org Membership

File: lib/towerops_web/scoped_resource.ex:15-20

Severity: MEDIUM — Cross-org resource existence probing

Description: Returns :forbidden for wrong-org resources vs :not_found for nonexistent. Organization A can probe if a specific resource ID belongs to Organization B.

Fix: Return :not_found in both cases — use Repo.get_by(schema, id: id, organization_id: organization_id).

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M2. Email Lookups Are Case-Sensitive

File: lib/towerops/accounts.ex:39-41

Severity: MEDIUM — Lookalike account registration possible

Description: Repo.get_by(User, email: email) — User@Example.com and user@example.com are separate accounts.

Fix: Add citext column or use fragment("LOWER(email) = LOWER(?)", ^email).

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M3. Captcha/Verification Token Pattern Matches

File: lib/towerops_web/user_auth.ex:70-86 (valid_return_path?)

Severity: MEDIUM — Open redirect via URL encoding bypasses

Description: Blacklist-based valid_return_path? can be bypassed with URL encoding: /%2f%2fevil.com, tab injection, double encoding.

Fix: Use whitelist approach matching known route prefixes.

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M4. Stripe Webhook Signature Not Enforced at Plug Level

File: lib/towerops_web/router.ex:144-148

Severity: MEDIUM — Any future controller could forget to verify

Description: Stripe webhook verification is deferred entirely to the controller with no router-level enforcement.

Fix: Create a dedicated Stripe webhook auth plug.

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M5. Rate Limiting Keyed Only by IP

File: lib/towerops_web/plugs/rate_limit.ex:57

Severity: MEDIUM — NAT'd users share budget; IP-rotation bypasses limits

Description: Rate limit key is "#{type}:#{remote_ip}" with no user/token component. Users behind NAT share a single budget. Attackers with large IP pools bypass limits entirely.

Fix: Include current_user.id or token ID in the key: "#{type}:#{user_id}:#{remote_ip}".

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M6. get_node_detail Loads Entire Organization

File: lib/towerops/topology.ex:612-663

Severity: MEDIUM — Massive unnecessary data transfer for single node lookup

Description: Loads ALL device IDs and ALL unlinked DeviceLink records for the entire organization just to find one node.

Fix: Find the link directly with a join query based on the discovered node ID.

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M7. No Unique Constraint on (organization_id, email) for Invitations

File: Migration 20251221192513_create_organization_invitations.exs

Severity: MEDIUM — Duplicate pending invitations possible; XSS-like confusion

Description: Individual indexes on token, organization_id, email but no composite unique for pending invitations.

Fix: Add create unique_index(:organization_invitations, [:organization_id, :email], where: "accepted_at IS NULL").

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M8. Webhook Secret Misconfiguration Disclosed

File: lib/towerops_web/plugs/webhook_auth.ex:36-43

Severity: MEDIUM — Attacker can determine webhook endpoint has zero auth

Description: Returns "Webhook authentication not configured" in the HTTP response body.

Fix: Return generic %{error: "Internal server error"}.

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M9. Information Disclosure via KMZ Error

File: lib/towerops_web/controllers/api/v1/coverages_controller.ex:203-204

Severity: MEDIUM — Internal paths and system errors leaked to client

Description: inspect(reason) is sent in error response. Could include system paths from File.read, :zip.create, or file system errors.

Fix: Log error server-side, return generic message.

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M10. [membership] Pattern Match Crash

File: lib/towerops_web/controllers/api/account_data_controller.ex:75

Severity: MEDIUM — 500 error for edge-case membership counts

Description: [membership] = org.memberships crashes with MatchError if 0 or 2+ memberships.

Fix: Use case org.memberships do [membership] -> ... end.

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M11. ActivityController String.to_existing_atom on User Input

File: lib/towerops_web/controllers/api/v1/activity_controller.ex:37-41

Severity: MEDIUM — Unpredictable atom matching from user-supplied strings

Description: User-supplied filter types are converted to atoms via to_existing_atom. If a string happens to match an internal atom, query behavior could be altered.

Fix: Whitelist allowed atom values.

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M12. No Superuser Verification in Admin LiveViews

Files: All admin/*.ex LiveViews

Severity: MEDIUM — No defense-in-depth if route misconfiguration exposes admin views

Description: Router applies :require_superuser but admin LiveViews don't perform their own current_scope.superuser check.

Fix: Add on_mount or mount superuser verification to admin LiveViews.

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M13. CSV/Download Content-Type Validation Missing

File: assets/js/app.ts:374-393

Severity: MEDIUM — Downloaded HTML file could execute scripts

Description: The phx:download handler accepts any mime_type from server. If server ever allows user content to influence mime_type, an HTML download with scripts could be created.

Fix: Add client-side mime_type allowlist.

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M14. WeatherSyncWorker Blocks Queue with Process.sleep

File: lib/towerops/workers/weather_sync_worker.ex:46-53

Severity: MEDIUM — Worker holds queue slot for 110s+ for 100 sites

Description: Process.sleep(1_100) between each site fetch blocks the Oban queue slot.

Fix: Use Task.async_stream with max_concurrency: 1 and timeout, or dispatch per-site jobs.

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M15. CloudLatencyProbeWorker Unbounded PubSub Message

File: lib/towerops/workers/cloud_latency_probe_worker.ex:39-43

Severity: MEDIUM — Megabyte-sized PubSub messages with many devices

Description: Full device list broadcast as single PubSub message. With thousands of devices, this can overwhelm PubSub.

Fix: Chunk the device list or send IDs that agents resolve independently.

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M16. MutationObserver Not Stored for Cleanup

File: assets/js/app.ts:284-310

Severity: MEDIUM — Memory leak on every page navigation mounting this hook

Description: const observer = new MutationObserver(...) — stored locally, not as this.observer. The destroyed() method checks this.observer which is never set.

Fix: Change const observer to this.observer = ....

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M17. SNMPv3 Fallback to MD5 Auth Protocol

Files: Multiple executor files

Severity: MEDIUM — Cryptographically broken auth protocol

Description: Default SNMPv3 auth protocol is "MD5". MD5 is cryptographically broken for authentication.

Fix: Change default to "SHA-256" for new devices.

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M18. No String Length Validation for SNMP Credentials in Protobuf

File: lib/towerops/proto/decode.ex:1509-1593

Severity: MEDIUM — Memory exhaustion via oversized credential strings

Description: decode_snmp_device does NOT call validate_string on community, v3_auth_password, v3_priv_password. An attacker could send multi-megabyte credential strings.

Fix: Add validate_string with reasonable max lengths (255 bytes).

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M19. Missing Validation on Multiple Protobuf Decode Paths

File: lib/towerops/proto/decode.ex (multiple decode functions)

Severity: MEDIUM — No validation on decode_mikrotik_device, decode_mikrotik_command, decode_check, decode_snmp_query, decode_sensor, decode_interface

Description: Several decode functions have zero validation (no validate_string calls, no field-length checks).

Fix: Add validation consistent with existing validated decode paths.

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M20. MIB Upload — Hard Links Not Checked in Archive Extraction

File: lib/towerops_web/controllers/api/v1/mib_controller.ex:453-458

Severity: MEDIUM — Hard-linked files in archive could overwrite system files

Description: check_no_symlinks only checks symlinks. Hard links, device nodes, and fifos are not inspected.

Fix: Add check_no_hardlinks(paths) and check_no_special_files(paths) using File.stat.

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M21. ETS Rate Limit Table Is Public

File: lib/towerops/rate_limit.ex:156-164

Severity: MEDIUM — Any Erlang/Elixir process can manipulate rate limit counters

Description: :ets.new(table, [:named_table, :set, :public, ...]) — :public allows any process to read/write counters.

Fix: Use :protected and have GenServer expose hit/3 via call.

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M22. Impersonation Session Has No Expiry

File: lib/towerops_web/user_auth.ex:879-910

Severity: MEDIUM — Superuser impersonation persists indefinitely

Description: If a superuser starts impersonating and walks away, the session continues impersonating until manually stopped.

Fix: Tie impersonation to sudo mode or add dedicated expires_at.

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M23. Permission Checks Silent Failure on Unpreloaded Associations

File: lib/towerops_web/permissions.ex:140-146

Severity: MEDIUM — Hard-to-debug silent denial of access

Description: When org.memberships is not preloaded, Ecto.assoc_loaded? returns false, the if block evaluates to nil, and do_can? returns false silently.

Fix: Log a warning when permissions are checked without preloaded data.

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LOW

L1. Cloudflare API Token Potentially Leaked in Logs

File: lib/towerops/security/cloudflare_client.ex:47,74-76

Severity: LOW — Debug logging could expose bearer token

Description: Cloudflare API token is passed as Bearer token. If HTTP client logs headers in debug mode, token leaks to logs.

Fix: Ensure HTTP client strips authorization headers from logs.

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L3. IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Not Handled in Whitelist

File: lib/towerops/security/brute_force.ex:36-49

Severity: LOW — ::ffff:192.168.1.1 doesn't match whitelist entry 192.168.1.1

Description: Exact string matching means IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses bypass whitelist matching.

Fix: Normalize IPs via :inet.parse_address/1 before comparing.

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L4. No Auth on PromEx Metrics Port (Documentation Gap)

File: config/config.exs:106-117

Severity: LOW — Document that network isolation is the only protection

Description: auth_strategy: :none is acceptable if the port is firewalled, but this should be explicitly documented.

Fix: Add comment documenting expected network security.

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L7. Device Capacity Operations Missing Org Scoping

File: lib/towerops_web/live/device_live/show.ex:728-757

Severity: LOW — interface_id from params not verified to belong to user's org

Description: set_capacity handler uses the interface_id from client params with no org membership verification.

Fix: Verify interface belongs to a device in the user's org.

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L9. Duplicate Pattern in Sync Workers

Files: gaiia_sync_worker.ex, sonar_sync_worker.ex, splynx_sync_worker.ex, visp_sync_worker.ex, netbox_sync_worker.ex

Severity: LOW — Code duplication invites inconsistency

Description: Five workers have identical should_sync?/1 logic duplicated verbatim.

Fix: Extract to Integrations context module.

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L12. window.liveSocket Exposed Globally

File: assets/js/app.ts:423

Severity: LOW — CSRF token accessible via liveSocket.socket.params._csrf_token

Description: Exposing LiveSocket globally makes CSRF token trivially accessible to any XSS.

Fix: Guard behind NODE_ENV !== "production".

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L13. Overly Broad Changeset in Alert Updates

File: lib/towerops/alerts.ex:391-405

Severity: LOW — Alert.changeset/2 casts 17 fields for a partial update

Description: Using the full changeset for simple field updates (resolved_at) is fragile. Extra keys could overwrite system fields.

Fix: Use a dedicated changeset or Ecto.Changeset.change/2.

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L14. list_checks No Pagination

File: lib/towerops/monitoring.ex:24-32

Severity: LOW — No limit on check listing for orgs with thousands of checks

Fix: Add default limit and pagination support.

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L15. OpenWeatherMap API Key in URL Query Param

File: lib/towerops/weather/client.ex:13,65

Severity: LOW — API key in URL may be logged by Req in debug/trace

Fix: Use header-based auth or ensure Req strips query params from logs.

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L16. COW/Vault ETS Table Name Collision Risk

File: lib/towerops/vault.ex (ETS table naming)

Severity: LOW — If two nodes share a node name, ETS table creation could conflict

Fix: Use unique ETS names incorporating node identifier.

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SUMMARY

By Severity

Severity	Count	Key Areas
CRITICAL	13	XSS (maps, status page), IDOR (consent, members, reports), auth bypass (GDPR halt, webhook), credential exposure (k8s/secrets.yaml, Stripe in git, MikroTik over PubSub), runtime crash (Repo.all_by), dead code (brute force), SSL (no force_ssl), race condition (device quota)
HIGH	30	N+1 queries (mobile, Oban, alerts, capacity, latency), race conditions (create_check, apply_agent), injection (Search wildcard, OID, user input → atom/integer), IDOR (reports, checks), auth gaps (webhooks, sessions), CSP/HSTS, hardcoded salts, cookie flags, missing validation (protobuf, check creation), worker reliability (sync errors swallowed, weather never starts, unbounded processing)
MEDIUM	23	IDOR (resource scoping), email case-sensitivity, open redirect, Stripe webhook not enforced, rate limiting key, overfetching, missing unique constraint, error disclosure, pattern match crashes, admin defense-in-depth, download content-type, queue blocking, PubSub unbounded, memory leaks (MutationObserver), MD5 default, incomplete archive validation, public ETS, impersonation expiry, silent permission failures
LOW	16	Log leaks, TTL extension, IP normalization, config documentation, vault dev/prod bleed, version disclosure, device capacity scoping, insights IDOR, code duplication, listener cleanup, path validation, liveSocket global, broad changesets, pagination, API key in URL, ETS naming

Total: 82 issues (13 Critical, 30 High, 23 Medium, 16 Low)

Top 10 Priority Fixes

1. C1 — Stored XSS in Sites Map popup
2. C2 — IDOR in policy consent handler (client-controlled user_id)
3. C3 — Broken halt() in GDPR data export
4. C6 — Repo.all_by/2 runtime crash on password/email changes
5. C9 — Remove k8s/secrets.yaml with live production credentials
6. C10 — Remove hardcoded Stripe test key from source
7. C8 — Sanitize custom_css in status page to prevent HTML injection
8. C11 — Enable force_ssl in production
9. H7 — Add auth plug to webhook pipeline
10. H17 — Fix missing org scope on individual report operations