# Code Review Findings

> Full codebase audit conducted 2026-05-12. Covers OWASP Top 10, performance, reliability, and correctness issues across the entire TowerOps Web application.

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## HIGH

### H7. Unauthenticated Webhook Endpoints

**File:** `lib/towerops/router.ex:232-239`

**Severity:** HIGH — Webhook endpoints protected only by per-org secret, no router-level auth

**Description:** Gaiia, PagerDuty, and MikroTik webhooks use the `:api` pipeline which only has `plug :accepts, ["json"]` — no authentication. Auth is delegated entirely to each controller.

**Fix:** Add webhook auth plug at pipeline level.

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### H9. CSP `img-src https:` Wildcard

**File:** `lib/towerops_web/plugs/security_headers.ex:38`

**Severity:** HIGH — Broad data exfiltration vector via any XSS

**Description:** `https:` for img-src allows images from any HTTPS origin. Combined with any XSS, an attacker can exfiltrate data via image request URLs.

**Fix:** Restrict to specific domains.

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### H24. WeatherSyncWorker Never Starts

**File:** `lib/towerops/workers/weather_sync_worker.ex`

**Severity:** HIGH — Weather data never fetched (dead code path)

**Description:** Worker self-schedules at end of each run via `schedule_next/0`, but no initial trigger exists in any cron config. First run never occurs.

**Fix:** Add to Oban cron schedule or trigger at application startup.

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## MEDIUM



### M4. Stripe Webhook Signature Not Enforced at Plug Level

**File:** `lib/towerops_web/router.ex:144-148`

**Severity:** MEDIUM — Any future controller could forget to verify

**Description:** Stripe webhook verification is deferred entirely to the controller with no router-level enforcement.

**Fix:** Create a dedicated Stripe webhook auth plug.

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### M5. Rate Limiting Keyed Only by IP

**File:** `lib/towerops_web/plugs/rate_limit.ex:57`

**Severity:** MEDIUM — NAT'd users share budget; IP-rotation bypasses limits

**Description:** Rate limit key is `"#{type}:#{remote_ip}"` with no user/token component. Users behind NAT share a single budget. Attackers with large IP pools bypass limits entirely.

**Fix:** Include `current_user.id` or token ID in the key: `"#{type}:#{user_id}:#{remote_ip}"`.

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## LOW

### L1. Cloudflare API Token Potentially Leaked in Logs

**File:** `lib/towerops/security/cloudflare_client.ex:47,74-76`

**Severity:** LOW — Debug logging could expose bearer token

**Description:** Cloudflare API token is passed as Bearer token. If HTTP client logs headers in debug mode, token leaks to logs.

**Fix:** Ensure HTTP client strips authorization headers from logs.

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### L4. No Auth on PromEx Metrics Port (Documentation Gap)

**File:** `config/config.exs:106-117`

**Severity:** LOW — Document that network isolation is the only protection

**Description:** `auth_strategy: :none` is acceptable if the port is firewalled, but this should be explicitly documented.

**Fix:** Add comment documenting expected network security.

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### L15. OpenWeatherMap API Key in URL Query Param

**File:** `lib/towerops/weather/client.ex:13,65`

**Severity:** LOW — API key in URL may be logged by Req in debug/trace

**Fix:** Use header-based auth or ensure Req strips query params from logs.

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