# Code Review Findings > Full codebase audit conducted 2026-05-12. Covers OWASP Top 10, performance, reliability, and correctness issues across the entire TowerOps Web application. --- ## HIGH ### H7. Unauthenticated Webhook Endpoints **File:** `lib/towerops/router.ex:232-239` **Severity:** HIGH — Webhook endpoints protected only by per-org secret, no router-level auth **Description:** Gaiia, PagerDuty, and MikroTik webhooks use the `:api` pipeline which only has `plug :accepts, ["json"]` — no authentication. Auth is delegated entirely to each controller. **Fix:** Add webhook auth plug at pipeline level. --- ### H9. CSP `img-src https:` Wildcard **File:** `lib/towerops_web/plugs/security_headers.ex:38` **Severity:** HIGH — Broad data exfiltration vector via any XSS **Description:** `https:` for img-src allows images from any HTTPS origin. Combined with any XSS, an attacker can exfiltrate data via image request URLs. **Fix:** Restrict to specific domains. --- ### H11. Hardcoded Session Salts (8 bytes) **File:** `lib/towerops_web/endpoint.ex:11-12` **File:** `config/config.exs:135` **Severity:** HIGH — Weak entropy for cookie signing; identical across all environments **Description:** `signing_salt: "hrDZxLhd"` and `encryption_salt: "vK3p8mNx"` are hardcoded 8-byte salts. Phoenix recommends 16+ bytes. Also baked into source code — can't rotate without deploy. **Fix:** Load from env vars, increase to 16+ bytes. --- ### H24. WeatherSyncWorker Never Starts **File:** `lib/towerops/workers/weather_sync_worker.ex` **Severity:** HIGH — Weather data never fetched (dead code path) **Description:** Worker self-schedules at end of each run via `schedule_next/0`, but no initial trigger exists in any cron config. First run never occurs. **Fix:** Add to Oban cron schedule or trigger at application startup. --- ## MEDIUM ### M4. Stripe Webhook Signature Not Enforced at Plug Level **File:** `lib/towerops_web/router.ex:144-148` **Severity:** MEDIUM — Any future controller could forget to verify **Description:** Stripe webhook verification is deferred entirely to the controller with no router-level enforcement. **Fix:** Create a dedicated Stripe webhook auth plug. --- ### M5. Rate Limiting Keyed Only by IP **File:** `lib/towerops_web/plugs/rate_limit.ex:57` **Severity:** MEDIUM — NAT'd users share budget; IP-rotation bypasses limits **Description:** Rate limit key is `"#{type}:#{remote_ip}"` with no user/token component. Users behind NAT share a single budget. Attackers with large IP pools bypass limits entirely. **Fix:** Include `current_user.id` or token ID in the key: `"#{type}:#{user_id}:#{remote_ip}"`. --- ### M19. Missing Validation on Multiple Protobuf Decode Paths **File:** `lib/towerops/proto/decode.ex` (multiple decode functions) **Severity:** MEDIUM — No validation on `decode_mikrotik_device`, `decode_mikrotik_command`, `decode_check`, `decode_snmp_query`, `decode_sensor`, `decode_interface` **Description:** Several decode functions have zero validation (no `validate_string` calls, no field-length checks). **Fix:** Add validation consistent with existing validated decode paths. --- ### M20. MIB Upload — Hard Links Not Checked in Archive Extraction **File:** `lib/towerops_web/controllers/api/v1/mib_controller.ex:453-458` **Severity:** MEDIUM — Hard-linked files in archive could overwrite system files **Description:** `check_no_symlinks` only checks symlinks. Hard links, device nodes, and fifos are not inspected. **Fix:** Add `check_no_hardlinks(paths)` and `check_no_special_files(paths)` using `File.stat`. --- ### M21. ETS Rate Limit Table Is Public **File:** `lib/towerops/rate_limit.ex:156-164` **Severity:** MEDIUM — Any Erlang/Elixir process can manipulate rate limit counters **Description:** `:ets.new(table, [:named_table, :set, :public, ...])` — `:public` allows any process to read/write counters. **Fix:** Use `:protected` and have GenServer expose `hit/3` via `call`. --- ### M22. Impersonation Session Has No Expiry **File:** `lib/towerops_web/user_auth.ex:879-910` **Severity:** MEDIUM — Superuser impersonation persists indefinitely **Description:** If a superuser starts impersonating and walks away, the session continues impersonating until manually stopped. **Fix:** Tie impersonation to sudo mode or add dedicated `expires_at`. --- ## LOW ### L1. Cloudflare API Token Potentially Leaked in Logs **File:** `lib/towerops/security/cloudflare_client.ex:47,74-76` **Severity:** LOW — Debug logging could expose bearer token **Description:** Cloudflare API token is passed as Bearer token. If HTTP client logs headers in debug mode, token leaks to logs. **Fix:** Ensure HTTP client strips authorization headers from logs. --- ### L4. No Auth on PromEx Metrics Port (Documentation Gap) **File:** `config/config.exs:106-117` **Severity:** LOW — Document that network isolation is the only protection **Description:** `auth_strategy: :none` is acceptable if the port is firewalled, but this should be explicitly documented. **Fix:** Add comment documenting expected network security. --- ### L14. `list_checks` No Pagination **File:** `lib/towerops/monitoring.ex:24-32` **Severity:** LOW — No limit on check listing for orgs with thousands of checks **Fix:** Add default limit and pagination support. --- ### L15. OpenWeatherMap API Key in URL Query Param **File:** `lib/towerops/weather/client.ex:13,65` **Severity:** LOW — API key in URL may be logged by Req in debug/trace **Fix:** Use header-based auth or ensure Req strips query params from logs. --- ### L16. COW/Vault ETS Table Name Collision Risk **File:** `lib/towerops/vault.ex` (ETS table naming) **Severity:** LOW — If two nodes share a node name, ETS table creation could conflict **Fix:** Use unique ETS names incorporating node identifier.