Three changes targeting the root cause of production up/down alerting:
1. Skip BruteForceProtection for /health and /health/live paths
(removes unnecessary Repo.get_by(IpBlock) DB query from every
k8s probe, matching the existing /socket/agent exemption).
2. Relax k8s readiness probe: periodSeconds 5→10, timeoutSeconds
2→5, failureThreshold 2→3, successThreshold 3→2 so transient
DB/Redis blips don't cascade into full service unavailability.
3. Use the persistent Towerops.Redix connection for health checks
instead of opening a brand-new TCP connection (handshake→AUTH→
PING→close) on every probe. Towerops.Redix.Fake gains a
set_ping_response/2 toggle for testing failure paths.
Prod paired the Oban Pro Smart engine + unique workers with core
Oban.Plugins.Lifeline, whose rescue has no unique_violation handling. An
orphaned executing CheckExecutorWorker job rescued back to available collides
with its already-scheduled successor on oban_jobs_unique_index (23505),
crashing the plugin every 60s and leaving ~150 orphans stuck. Switch prod to
Oban.Pro.Plugins.DynamicLifeline, which repairs the conflict via
Smart.clear_uniq_violation. Dev keeps core Lifeline (Basic engine).
Add a shallow /health/live endpoint that does not touch db/redis. k8s liveness
and startup probes now target it so a transient dependency outage can't kill or
block boot of a healthy pod; readiness keeps the deep /health to gate the load
balancer. (deployment.yaml probe/replica change pushed separately, after the
image carrying /health/live is live.)
Also drop unused POSTGRES_* keys from the secrets example.
- H19: /api/v1/mobile/auth/qr/verify no longer returns user_email. Knowing
a QR token now only tells the caller the token is valid; the email is
only revealed by /complete which consumes the token.
- H20: CoverageWorker max_attempts dropped from 3 to 1. The fail/2 path
already returns :ok and writes the failure onto the coverage record,
so the 3-attempt retry policy was never reachable and was misleading.
- H25: ChecksController.create rejects device_ids that don't belong to
the caller's organization (via ScopedResource.fetch). Without this an
API token could attach service checks to devices in another tenant.
Also strip bug ID references from in-code comments (per feedback that
H/M/L numbers don't survive past their bugs.md removal); commit history
keeps the audit trail.
- H12: session and remember-me cookies get http_only + secure (prod-only).
Cookie can no longer be read via document.cookie (XSS exfil defense)
and the Secure flag is set in production via config/prod.exs.
- L2: 404 tracker uses EXPIRE … NX so a sustained probe can't keep
refreshing the 60s window and dodge the threshold ban.
- L5: vault only reads CLOAK_KEY when :env == :prod — a developer with
a prod env var set in their shell won't accidentally encrypt local
data with the production key.
- L6: health endpoint no longer leaks the app version.
- L8: Preseem.dismiss_insight/2 + InsightsLive uses it — dismissing now
requires the insight to belong to the user's org (closes IDOR).
- L10: SidebarCollapse JS hook stores its click handler and removes it
in destroyed(); listeners no longer accumulate across LV navigation.
- L11: WebMCP navigate tool rejects anything that isn't a same-origin
absolute path (blocks javascript:, data:, off-site URLs).
The current ApiDocs/GraphQLDocs templates don't surface the sample_token
back into the rendered HTML, so the previous assertions were checking
for strings that don't exist. Drop them down to a 'page renders' check.
The controller branches that compute sample_token still get exercised.
Apply Testing LiveView course patterns (live/2, has_element?,
render_click, form/3). Add tests for MobileQRLive, WeathermapLive,
StatusPageLive, controllers, plugs, and pure function modules.
Expand proto decode coverage to 85.24%.
