- LIKE wildcard injection: sanitize %, _ in search queries (devices, sites, gaiia)
- Jason.decode! → Jason.decode with error handling for untrusted input
- inspect() leak: replace with generic error messages, log details server-side
- SSRF protection: URL validator blocks private IPs, localhost, non-HTTP schemes
- SSRF validation added to HTTP monitoring executor and integration credentials
- GraphQL complexity limits: always applied, not just in prod
- GraphQL introspection: also check GET query params, not just body
- Stripe webhook: explicit nil/empty checks for signature and body
- Cookie security: secure flag for session (prod), http_only+secure for remember_me
- Honeybadger API key: read from env var with fallback
- String.to_integer → Integer.parse with fallback for URL params
- String.to_atom → whitelist map for HTTP methods
- Gaiia webhook: remove secret_len and expected signature from log
- Admin API: add rate limiting pipeline
- to_atom_keys: per-key fallback instead of all-or-nothing rescue
Removed all unused private functions and imports from BruteForceProtection
plug since the feature is currently disabled (Cloudflare handles security).
Functions can be restored from git history if feature is re-enabled.
Fixed compilation warnings:
- unused function track_404_if_needed/2
- unused function maybe_track_404/2
- unused function get_remote_ip/1
- unused function get_fallback_ip/1
- unused function format_remote_ip/1
- unused function check_and_block/2
- unused function block_request/2
- unused function agent_websocket?/1
- unused alias BruteForce
- unused import Plug.Conn
When a device resumes polling (last_snmp_poll_at updated), automatically
dismiss any active 'device_poll_gap' insights for that device.
This prevents stale insights from lingering after connectivity issues
are resolved (e.g., agent reconnection after being blocked).
Changes:
- Auto-dismiss device_poll_gap insights in update_snmp_poll_time()
- Log when insights are auto-dismissed for visibility
- Fix brute force protection compilation error
Disable all IP blocking and 404 tracking to allow unrestricted access
while we review and tune ban thresholds and exemptions.
This is a temporary measure to prevent legitimate traffic from being
blocked. Will re-enable after proper configuration.
Agent connections authenticate at the channel join level with token
validation, so they should not be subject to IP-based brute force
protection. This prevents legitimate agents from being banned when
connecting to the server.
Changes:
- Exempt /socket/agent/websocket from all IP ban checks
- Update documentation to reflect agent exemption
- Agents still authenticate securely via token during channel join
The plug was attempting to register a before_send callback after
blocking a banned IP and sending a 403 response. This caused
Plug.Conn.AlreadySentError in production.
Fixed by checking conn.halted before attempting to register the
404 tracking callback. If the request was already blocked and sent,
we skip the callback registration.
Also updated the test to verify proper behavior without the
workaround for AlreadySentError.
